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ABSTRACT
We study the general equilibrium effects of social insurance on the
transition in a model in which the process of moving workers from matches in
the state sector to new matches in the private sector takes time and involves
uncertainty. We fmd that adding social insurance may slow transition. When
there are incentive problems in this rematching process, the optimal social
insurance scheme may involve forced layoffs and involuntary unemployment.
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of MinneapolisIntroduction:
In the long run, the process of transition in the former com-
munist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will
involve moving large numbers of agents from old production ac-
tivities in the state sector into new production activities in the
emerging private sector. We imagine that, for the individual
worker, this is a turbulent process. During transition, a worker
who leaves the state sector abandons old production activities
and the specific skills attached to them and must spend some
time trying to find a good match with new skills and a new activ-
ity in the private sector. Even in the United States, for example,
for workers trying out new production activities, the process of
finding a productive match in a lifetime job can require several
attempts and substantial amounts of time. (See Hall (1982)).
In this paper, we study a simple general equilibrium model
of this process of transition which, at the micro level, emphasizes
that the process of matching workers to new activities takes time
and involves uncertainty. We use the model to study the general
equilibrium effects that social insurance has on the transition pro-
cess. We focus on social insurance that protects workers against
the income risk that they face while they search for a new match
in the private sector. We begin with a model in which there
are no incentive problems created by social insurance. Some-
2what surprisingly, we find that, even when there are no incentive
problems created by social insurance, adding complete social in-
-surancemay actually slow transition. We then consider a model
with incentive problems in the design of social insurance by sup-
posing that agents must exert unobserved effort to search for
a new production activity. Complete social insurance equalizes
consumption across agents and, with such incentive problems,
not only slows the transition, but actually prevents it. To en-
courage agents to exert effort in search during the transition, it
is necessary to spread the distribution of consumption. Interest-
ingly, though, even the optimal, incentive compatible social in-
surance scheme may actually slow transition. Furthermore, this
optimal incentive compatible scheme may involve forced layoffs
and involuntary unemployment in the sense that agents who are
required to leave their old matches and search for new matches
are made strictly worse off than agents who are allowed to remain
in their old matches.
We offer two interpretations of this model and the reason for
the transition. The first is a major tax reform in a closed econ-
omy. Under the original policy, the government taxed the returns
in the private sector activities at such a high rate that it was op-
timal for agents to work in the state sector. The government
then undertakes a major tax reform which reduces the taxes on
3the private sector activities. The second interpretation is one of a
small economy opening up to trade in goods. Under the original
policy barring trade, domestic prices differed substantially from
world prices and induced agents to enter activities which had low
productivity when productivity is measured at world prices. The
government then opens the economy to balanced trade in goods
at world prices.
The basic structure of the model draws on elements of the
search literature (for a comprehensive discussion see Mortensen
(1986) and Pissarides (1990)). More specifically, our model is re-
lated to models of sectoral reallocation in the labor market (see,
for example, Rogerson (1987)). Recently, several authors have
used sectoral reallocation models to study the dynamics of tran-
sition, including Blanchard (1991), Dixit and Rob (1991), and
Fernandez and Rodrik (1992). Blanchard presents a model of
the dynamics of the transition of the labor force from the state
sector to the private sector which builds in several market imper-
fections. He then analyzes the effect of unemployment benefits
and incomes policy on the transition. Fernandez and Rodrik con-
sider a model of sectoral adjustment following trade reform that
focuses on agents' incentives to block the reform when they face
idiosyncratic uncertainty about the cost of the reform. The most
closely related paper is Dixit and Rob. They consider a model
4of sectoral adjustment and they study the impact of social insur-
ance on agents' incentives to move between sectors. Their model,
however, focuses on the properties of the stochastic steady state
and the impact of social insurance on the hysteresis bands.
In terms of the general equilibrium effects of alternative so-
cial insurance schemes, our work is related to the work of Green-
wood and Jovanovic (1990) and Bencivenga and Smith (1991).
Both of these papers present models of financial intermediation
and growth in which financial intermediaries provide a risk pool-
ing role for investor which is somewhat analogous to social in-
surance in our model. In contrast to our work, however, these
papers focus on the implications of financial intermediation for
steady state growth rather than transition.
One interpretation of our results is that alternative financial
and institutional arrangements interact with the speed and na-
ture of the transition. In several recent papers, Calvo and Con-
celli (1992) have analyzed how various imperfections in credit
markets interact with the nature of transition. They emphasize
the contractionary effects that arise from freeing nominal prices
in an environment with restrictions on credit to enterprises.
In the model with unobserved effort in search, we show that
the optimal incentive compatible social insurance scheme may
involve involuntary unemployment. There is a body of work
5that investigates a type of involuntary unemployment that arises
as part of the optimal contracts designed to solve the incentive
problems that arise when the employer has private information
about the workers' productivity. (See, for example, Chari(1983),
Cooper (1987), and Green and Kahn (1983)). There is also a
literature that investigates a type of involuntary unemployment
that arises in models with non-convexities such as indivisibili-
ties in hours worked. (See, for example, Rogerson and Wright
(1988)). Our model is different from these both in the conditions
under which there is involuntary unemployment and in the in-
terpretation. In these previous literatures, the conditions involve
the normality of leisure, while ours involve derivatives of the util-
ity for goods. In these other models, the optimal contracts are
between private firms and workers. Here we interpret the so-
cial insurance problem as that of a state which both employs the
workers in their old matches and pays their social insurance when
they search.
In the paper, we begin with a presentation of our main result
in a two period version of the model without incentive problems.
Next, we extend this result to the infinite horizon and also show
that social insurance affects not only the transition process but
also the steady state level of output and employment in the new
sector. Finally, we consider the model with unobserved effort in
6search, show that the main result holds, and also show there can
be involuntary unemployment.
1. The Environment andInterpretation
We consider an economy that lasts two time periods, has a
continuum of agents, and two sectors in which production takes
place. Each agent is endowed with one unit of time at each date
t= 0,1 and has preferences over consumption characterized by
the utility function U(co)+/3EU(ci). The two production sectors
are labelled sector 1 and sector A. An agent who works in sector
1 produces 1 unit of output each period he works in that sector.
An agent who works in sector A produces either A1 or A2 units
of output. We assume A1 >1and A1 >A2.All agents are
assumed to be in sector 1 at date 0. At this time, agents can
either work in sector 1 or move to sector A. To move to sector A,
an agent must spend one period searching for a good match with
an activity in that sector. Agents who move to sector A either
find a good match with an activity in that sector with probability
ir and produce A1 at date 1, or they fail to find a good match
with probability (1 —ir)and produce A2 at date 1.
Let zE[0, 1] denote the fraction of agents who search for an
activity in sector A at date 0. Letdenote the consumption at
date 0 of an agent who searches for an activity in sector A and
c denote the consumption at date 0 of an agent who works in
7sector 1. Let c4'denotethe consumption at date 1 of an agent
who searches at date 0 and finds a high productivity activity in
sector A, C2theconsumption at date 1 of an agent who searches
at date 0 and fails to find a high productivity activity in sector
A, and cItheconsumption at date 1 of an agent who works both





We offer two interpretations of this model of transition: a
closed economy that undergoes a major tax reform and a small
economy that opens to trade. First consider the tax reform in-
terpretation of the model. Under this interpretation, we assume
that the production activities in sector 1 and the production ac-
tivities in sector A require different types of labor. The produc-
tion activities in sector 1 each require one unit of raw, homoge-
neous labor. The production activities in sector A each require
one unit of task-specific skilled labor. The are many different
types of production activities in sector A. Agents are endowed
with raw, homogeneous labor and an inherent ability in a sub-
set of the many different task-specific skills. Ex-ante, agents do
8not know the skills in which they have inherent ability. For an
agent to work in sector A, he first must spend a period acquiring
one task-specific skill. If an agent has acquired the skill which
matches his inherent ability, his output in that activity is A1. If
he acquires a skill which does not match his ability, his output is
A2. We suppose that, under the original tax system, the effective
rate on skilled activities is so high that all agents choose to work
in unskilled activities. This effective tax rate is meant to capture
the full range of distortionary policies which discourage enter-
prising agents from investing the time necessary to find a good
match for their skills. The tax reform corresponds to changes in
policies which lower this effective tax rate enough to encourage
agents to attempt to find good matches in skilled activities. Al-
ternatively, if we assume that A2 =1,we can interpret workers in
sector 1 as working in activities in which they are badly matched.
In this case, the movement of workers into sector A in the model
can be interpreted as workers attempting to find good matches.
In either case, we think of this model as capturing in a simple
way the idea that the old system did not lead workers to find
good matches with their production activities, whereas the new
system does.
Now consider the trade reform interpretation. In this inter-
pretation, we assume that the activities in both sectors require
9task-specific skilled labor but differ in that they produce different
goods. The production activities in sector 1 all produce one final
consumption good x and the activities in sector A all produce
another final consumption good y. In sector 1, agents who are
matched to their activity produce B1 (equal to 1 in the model)
units of good x and agents who are not matched produce B2 (not
observed in the model) units of good x. In sector A, agents who
are matched to their activity produce A1 units of good y and
agents who are not matched produce A2 units of good y. Agents
who leave either sector have a probability ir of finding a good
match in the other sector on any given attempt to find a match.
Agents have period utility for these two goods v(x, y). Let q be
the price of y in terms of x. Then agents have indirect utility
q) defined by
q) =maxv(x,y) subject to x + qy ￿ c
x,y
Whenthe economy is closed to trade, the relative price q that
prevails when every agent has found a good match is q =-. We
assume that preferences are such that most of the labor force pro-
duces good x. (For instance, let v(x,y) =alog(x)+(1—ci)Iog(y)
with a close to one.) When this small economy opens to trade,
it is faced with world price q =1.To take advantage of its com-
parative advantage in good y, agents move from producing x to
10producing y. The period utility function in the model u(c) cor-
responds in this case to the indirect utility function1). The
resource constraints (1) and (2) then correspond to the condition
that trade be balanced each period and thus we abstract from in-
ternational borrowing and lending. Here, we interpret the initial
conditions with all workers well-matched in sector 1 as arising
as the steady state outcome of the old trade regime. In this old
steady state, all bad matches have been dissolved and are thus
not observed.
In terms of the empirical implications of the model, it is im-
portant to note that under both of these interpretations the shifts
across activities may well not show up as shifts across sectors as
conventionally measured. For example, in the tax reform inter-
pretation, imagine workers in a state restaurant in Russia just
after privatization. They may well "search" across restaurant
types to find a good match, where types are characterized by,
say, ethnicity, price range, and location. Moreover, even within
a given restaurant a worker that had a certain position under
the old regime may "search" for a new position which involves
new responsibilities in the new economic environment for which
the previous experience provides little guidance. Under the trade
reform interpretation an example might be Polish producers who
under the CMEA trading system manufactured mediocre goods,
11which after the reform were unprofitable at the world prices.
These producers may search for new types of goods to manu-
facture that will be profitable at world prices. In both of these
interpretations this search process will not involve movements
across sectors as defined in GNP accounts but rather across ac-
tivities within the same sector and perhaps even within the same
firm. Much of this search may be done while workers still offi-
cially retain their old jobs. If so, then this search will show up
not as a rise in unemployment but as a drop in productivity of
existing firms.
2. The Impact of Social Insurance
In this section we show that adding social insurance to pro-
tect agents against the risk that they may fail to find a good
match in sector A will actually slow transition if agents have
a strong enough precautionary demand for saving and are not
very risk averse. We begin by considering an environment in
which there are no private markets for insuring away the idiosyn-
cratic risk experienced by agents who search, agents who work
are paid their marginal product each period, and the only asset
that agents trade at date 0 is a bond which pays off one unit of
consumption for sure at date 1. At date 0, agents choose whether
to work in sector 1 or to search. Clearly, if an agent works in
sector 1 at date 0, he will find it optimal to work in sector 1 again
12at date 1.
An agent who works both periods in sector 1 earns one unit
of wages at each date. If we let p denote the price at date 0
of a sure bond paying one unit of consumption at date 1 and
b the quantity of such bonds purchased, an agent who works
both periods in sector 1 faces budget constraints + pb ￿ 1
and cI ￿ 1 + b. Such an agent maximizes utility U(c) + 13U(cf)
subject to these budget constraints. Let V1' (p) denote the indirect
utility of an agent works in sector 1. The subscript i stands for
"incomplete". Let c(p) denote that agent's demand for first
period consumption. An agent who searches earns no wages at
date 0 and at date 1 earns A1 with probability ir and A2 with
probability (1 —ir).This agent faces budget constraints c +
pb ￿ 0, c A1 + b, and C2￿A2 + b. This agent maximizes
utility U(c) +j9(irU(cj'') + (1 —ir)U(cj42))subjectto these budget
constraints. Note that we can write the budget constraints for
this agent as
c +p(1rc1+(1 —7r)c2)￿ p(irAi + (1 —ir)A2) (3)
Ctl￿c + (A1 —A2). (4)
Let Vf(p) denote the indirect utility of an agent who searches
and c(p) denote his first period demand.
13An equilibrium without social insurance is an allocation
anda bond pricepsuch that (c,,c) is opti-
mal for an agent who works both periods in sector 1, (ct, cr',cj2)
isoptimal for agent who searches, resource constraints (1) and
(2) are satisfied, and either z =0and V11(p) ￿ VZ(p)orz ￿ 0
and V1(p) =Vjz(p). Inthe appendix we show that there is a
unique equilibrium without social insurance.
Consider next the equilibrium when we add social insurance
that completely eliminates idiosyncratic risk. This equilibrium
allocation is the ex-ante optimal allocation and can be decen-
tralized in many ways. In one decentralization the only private
financial markets are for risk free bonds and the governmentpro-
vides social insurance through taxes and transfers. In order to
facilitate comparison to the equilibrium without social insurance,
we focus on this decentralization. In this decentralization, work-
ers are paid their marginal product. The income of an agent
who works both periods in sector 1 is one unit each period. The
income of an agent who searches is zero at date 0 and A1 with
probability r and A2 with probability (1 —ir)at date 1. This
agent receives social insurance transfers [irAi + (1 —ir)A2]
—A1
if he produces A1 and transfers [irA1 + (1 —ir)A2]
—A2if he pro-
duces A2. With such transfers, an agent who searches receives
after-transfer income equal to [irA1 + (1 —ir)A2]whether or not
14he succeeds in search. Since this social insurance scheme simply
pools the risk among those who search, it is self financing and
thus involves no taxes on or transfers to the agents who work
both periods in sector 1.
Denote the indirect utility functions and first period demand
functions for agents who stay in sector 1 by V'(j.) and c(p).The
subscript c stands for "complete". Since agents who work both
periods in sector 1 face the same budget constraints with and
without social insurance, V'(p) =V7(p)and c(p) =c(p).De-
note the indirect utility functions and first period demand func-
tions for agents who search by V (p) and c(p).These agents
face a lifetime budget constraint (3). Note that the constraint
(4) no longer applies. The definition of an equilibrium with
social insurance is identical to that of an equilibrium without
social insurance except that constraint (4) no longer binds. We
show in the appendix that there is a unique equilibrium with
social insurance.
The calculation of equilibrium with and without social in-
surance is illustrated with a parametric example in Figure 1. We
set A1 =6,A2 =1,3 =1,r =.9,and assume agents have
CRRA utility of the form u(c) =c'/ywith -y =—.5.We plot
the indirect utility functions V' (p), Vz (p), and Vf (p) in the up-
per panel. The equilibrium bond price without social insurance
15is found at the point pj such that V'(p1) =Vj(fi1).The equilib-
rium bond price without social insurance is found at the point p,
such that V' (pa) =V(p)• The equilibrium number of searchers
z in each case can then be found from the condition (1) that the
goods market clears at date 0. From this condition, we write zj
as a function of the bond price p:
1-c'(p) zj(p)=l-c1(p)+c(p)
(5)
and similarly for z
1-c'(p)
(6)
Observe that as long a.s pfi,c}(p)￿1, so that zj(p) and
zC(p)aredecreasing in p. We plot the functions zj(p)andzc(p)
inthe lower panel. The equilibrium number of searchers in each
case is then found at zj(pj) and zC(PC) respectively. We see in
this figure that the addition of social insurance raises the number
of searchers in equilibrium in this case. In figure 2, we present
the same illustration of the determination of equilibrium in a
parametric example in which the addition of social insurance re-
duces the number of searchers in equilibrium. In this case we set
A1 =6,A2 =1,,8 =1,ir =.9,and assume agents have CRRA
utility of the form u(c) =c7/-ywith y =.2.
16The fact that social insurance has an ambiguous impact on
the speed of transition can be understood as follows. Since by
definition '(y) >I/Z(p)for all p, if there is search in equilib-
rium with social insurance, then the equilibrium bond price p
is strictly less than the bond price p1inthe equilibrium without
social insurance. The difference pj— pis larger the greater is
agents' (absolute) risk aversion. To determine whether the drop
in the bond price (increase in the interest rate) induced by insur-
ance raises the number of searchers, it is necessary to compare
zj(pj)andz(p).Thisranking depends both on agents' risk
aversion and on whether agents have a precautionary demand
for saving.
Following Leland (1968), we say that agents have precau-
tionary demand for saving at price p if c(p) <c(p).(For
other work on the precautionary demand for saving, see Kim-
ball (19??), and Zeldes (19??).) As Leland shows, if agents are
risk averse and U' is a strictly convex function, then agents have
precautionary demand for saving for all p. These conditions are
satisfied when utility takes the CRRA or CARA form. If U'(.) is
concave, then there is no precautionary demand for saving. Since
c(p) =c(p),then, for all p, the function zc(p)lieseverywhere
above zj(p) if agents do not have precautionary demand for sav-
ing. In this case, adding insurance must speed transition. On
17the other hand, if agents have precautionary demand for saving,
then, for all p, the function zj(p) lies everywhere above zc(p).
Then adding insurance slows transition if the precautionary de-
mand for saving is strong and if agents are not too risk averse so
that the change in the bond price induced by insurance is small.
To see which case is the relevant case when agents have CRRA
preferences of the form c7/y,wepresent a plot of the equilibrium
vaIuesofzandzjwithA1=6,A2=1,18=1,ir=.9,aswe
vary y between —1 and 1 in figure 3. We summarize our results
on the impact of optimal social insurance on the cost and speed
of transition as follows.
Result 1: Adding perfect social insurance into an economy
with uncontingent loans raises welfare and increases the equilib-
rium interest rate. Social insurance speeds transition if agents
have little or no precautionary demand for saving. Social insur-
ance slows transition if agents have a large precautionary demand
for saving and are not very risk averse.
We can see that this result depends on the general equilib-
rium considerations that arise in the closed economy by compar-
ing this result with the impact of social insurance on the speed of
transition in the model when residents of the country can freely
borrow or lend abroad at a fixed world interest rate. In the
open economy, we modify the definition of equilibrium with and
18without insurance by replacing the resource constraints by the
requirement that the domestic bond price be equal to the world
bond price given by p'.
We can use figure 1 again to illustrate the open economy
equilibrium without social insurance. If p4 is below the price
pj at which Vjz(p)andV'(p) intersect, then there is no search
in equilibrium all agents prefer to remain in the old sector. If
p4 =Pi,then all agents are indifferent between staying in the old
sector or searching for a match in the new sector. In this case,
any value of z e[0,1] is consistent with equilibrium. If p4 > Pi,
then all agents strictly prefer to search for a match in sector A
and leave sector 1 to do so immediately. The determination of
equilibrium with social insurance is similar to the case without
social insurance. In this case, there all agents search if pt > p =
[irAi+ (1 —ir)A2
—1]_1.If p4 < p, there is no search. Since
<pa, there is a range of world bond prices p4 between p and
pj for which search occurs with social insurance and does not
occur without social insurance. Thus, social insurance cannot
decrease search in equilibrium. This result makes it clear that
our earlier result that adding social insurance may slow transition
depends on the requirement in general equilibrium that aggregate
consumption be equal to aggregate output in each period.
Notice that in the open economy, in the transition, output
19and employment fall but consumption does not. Indeed, if there
is social insurance and p =3,then consumption jumps immedi-
ately to its new long run level and output and employment fall
more than they do when there is no international borrowing or
lending. Since agents in this economy can borrow abroad at first
to finance their consumption during the transition, the transition
is less costly when international borrowing is possible.
3. Extension to the Infinite Horizon
In this section, we extend our result to a version of our model
in which there is an infinite time horizon by demonstrating in a
parametric example that adding social insurance may slow tran-
sition. We also show in this version of the model that adding
social insurance changes not just the transition, but also raises
the steady state level of output. This is because, when there
is no social insurance and agents' risk aversion varies with their
level of wealth, some agents will be too risk averse to search for
a match in sector A, whereas all agents would search if social
insurance were added.
To extend the result that the addition of social insurance
can slow transition to the infinite horizon framework, we modify
the environment in the following respects. Time is denoted t=
0,1, 2 All agents in the model have identical preferences of
the form U =EEo/3tu(ct).We assume that A1 =A>1 and
20A2 =1.Letbe the number of agents who have good matches
in sector A at date t.Theseagents produce output A) at date
t.Letzj be the number of searchers and let (1 —14
—zt)be the
number of agents who work but are not well-matched in sector
A at date t.Theseagents who work when not well matched in
sector A produce (1 —— z). Atdate 0 there is some initial
stock of agents ) who are well-matched in sector A. At every
date t,anyagent who is not well matched in sector A can search
for a match in sector A. An agent who searches must forgo
employment for that period and has a probability ir of finding a
good match in sector A. Current production and next period's




In the appendix, we present a solution method for equilib-
rium with and without social insurance in this model when agents
have constant absolute risk aversion with preferences given by
u(c) =— exp(—yc).In the equilibrium without social insurance,
we assume that the only asset that agents trade are one-period
uncontingent bonds. In figure 4, we present transition paths for
output and A4 when A =10,j= .6,ir =2/5,with the coefli-
21cient of absolute risk aversion =2.In this figure, we see that
adding social insurance slows transition.
In the parametric example presented above, we assumed that
agents have constant absolute risk aversion. This assumption
implies that, in the equilibrium without social insurance, agents'
decisions to take on the risk of searching for a good match are not
affected by their level of wealth. As a result, as long as search
is worthwhile for some agent at bond price p =/3,the unique
steady state of the model has all agents well matched in sector
A. On the other hand, this is not true if agents do not have
constant absolute risk aversion.
We characterize which agents will choose never to search for
a match in sector A in the context of the economy with no social
insurance and international borrowing and lending as follows. Let
the international uncontingent bond price be given by p =/3.
An agent who stays in sector 1 forever and begins life with initial
bond holdings b0 earns wages 1 every period and has constant
consumption c =(1p*) + 1 every period. An agent who is
well matched in sector A and has initial bond holdings b0 earns A
every period and has constant consumption c1 =(1
—p)bo+ A.
Thus, all agents who are in sector 1 and have bond holdings b0
such that
1/(1 —/3)u((i_p*) + 1) > (21)
22maxu(bo p*b)+
—3)[iru((1
—p)b'+ A) + (1 —7r)u((1
—p)b'+ 1)]
will not want to deviate at date 0 from the strategy of never
searching for a match in sector A. Since agents' preferences are
continuous and their utility is bounded under any feasible strat-
egy, the result that they never want to deviate for one period
from the strategy of never searching for a match in sector A im-
plies that this strategy is the optimal strategy for these agents.
Observe that when agents have constant absolute risk aversion,
if (21) holds for any initial level of bond holdings b0, it holds for
all initial level of bond holdings.
4. The Impact of Social Insurance with Incentive
Problems:
In this section, we examine the nature of optimal social in-
surance in a modified version of this environment in which agents
who search must exert some unobserved effort to have any chance
of finding a good match. We find that even the optimal incen-
tive compatible insurance scheme may slow transition. Moreover,
the optimal scheme involves both a fanning out of the distribu-
tion of consumption and may require a type of forced layoffs and
involuntary unemployment.
In this version of the model, agents who exert effort in search
23have a probability ir of finding a good match in sector A, while
agents who do not exert effort in search have no chance of finding
a good match in sector A. Agents who neither work nor exert
effort in search gain utility i from their leisure. Thus, ifagents
who search are to be induced to put effort into theirsearch, it
must be the case that
U(c) + /3[irU(cj') + (1 —7r)U(cj2)] ￿U(c) + /3U(cj42)+i
or that
U(c') ￿ U(cj) + ii (22)
where ii= /9iri.If i is sufficiently small, then the equilibrium al-
locations without social insurance discussed in the previoussec-
tion is incentive compatible. We assume that i is sufficiently
small that this is the case. Of course, withany positive i, the
equilibrium allocation with complete social insurance is not in-
centive compatible.
To find the optimal incentive compatible allocation, it is
convenient to let the choice variables in the planning problem be
utility levels and number of searchers rather than consumption
levels and number of searchers. To that end, let C =U'denote
the inverse utility function. The planning problem which defines
the ex-ante optimal allocation with moral hazard in search isas
follows. Choose z and utilities u, u, u, u,uto maximize the
24objective
z(u + /3{iruj4+(1 —7r)u2]) +(1 —z)(u+ i3uD (23)
subject to
u1￿ U1 + V (24)
zC(u) + (1- z)C(u) <(1-z) (25)
(1 —z)C(u)+ zirC(t44') + z(1 —ir)C(u2) ￿
(1 —z)+ zrA1 + z(1 —ir)A2 (26)
We begin by comparing the speed of transition without so-
cial insurance to that under optimal incentive compatible social
insurance scheme given as the solution to above problem. Note
first that when v =0,there is no incentive problem, and the
allocation with complete social insurance is the solution to this
problem. The solution to this problem is a continuous function
of the parameter ii, and thus for small v, the solution is close
to the complete insurance allocation. Thus, in a manner similar
to that in section 2, we construct an example in which adding
optimal incentive compatible social insurance slows transition.
For example, with v =1and the rest of the parameters as in
Figure 2, the optimal choice of z is .50. The number of searchers
in the equilibrium without social insurance is z =.61.Similar
results hold for a range of values of v. It should be possible to
25use the methods like those in Atkeson and Lucas (1993) to show
that optimal insurance also slows transition inan infinite horizon
version of the model.
More interesting is the possibility that the optimal insur-
ance scheme may involve forced layoffs and involuntary unem-
ployment. In that vein, consider the first order conditions to the
planning problem. These include
C'(u) =C'(u) (27)
and
C'(u) =C'(u')+ (1 —)C'(u'
—ii) (28)
These first order conditions yield the followingproposition.
Result 2: When agents must exert unobserved effort in
search, under the optimal social insurance scheme, agents who
work in sector 1 both periods receive higher expectedutility than
agents who search if and only if C'(.) is strictly convex.
To see this, not that since C(.) is strictlyconvex, (25) im-
plies that the per period utility assigned to each type ofagent
in the first period is the same. The expected utilityassigned
in the second period to agents who stay in the old sector is u.
The expected utility assigned in the second period toagents who
search is iruj4' + (1 —ir)(ut' —ii). Theresult follows directly from
26equation (26). Note that when utility takes the CARA form
tt(c)= — exp(—yc),then C'(u) is convex. When utility takes the
CRRA form u(c)= y ￿ 1, then the function C'(u) is convex
when y <, linearwhen y =, andconcave otherwise.
Clearly, to implement such a scheme, not all agents can be
allowed to choose to stay in their matches in the old sector. It
is because of this element of coercion that we interpret the lay-
offs as "forced" and the unemployment as "involuntary". We
think of this social insurance problem as capturing elements of
the problem faced by a reforming government that employs a
large number of workers in the state sector and also pays unem-
ployment insurance during transition. The government decides a
fraction of the workers in the state sector to layoff, the amount of
unemployment insurance to pay those that are laid off, and the
unemployment insurance premiums to charge those who work in
the state sector and those that find new matches in the private
sector so as to maximize the expected welfare of all citizens.
We also can use these first order condition to examine the
evolution of the distributioii of consumption during transition.
As part of the optimal social insurance scheme in the presence
of moral hazard, the distribution of consumption is concentrated
at a point in the first period and then fans out in the second
as agents are rewarded for finding high productivityactivities
27or punished for not finding such activities. Attempts to undo
this spreading in the distribution of consumption induced by the
transition process would remove the incentives for agents to put
effort into search and would thus result in a less than optimal
outcome.
Conclusion:
In this paper we have studied the impact of social insurance
on the transition process. We have shown that social insurance
can slow transition, entail involuntary unemployment, and have
an impact on the steady state level of output. In this analysis we
have abstracted from several important issues, including political
considerations surrounding transition. For models of the role of
politics in transition, see Dewatripont and Roland (1992) and
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991).
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30Appendix
In this appendix we prove, in the two period model that there
is a unique equilibrium without social insurance and a unique
equilibrium with social insurance. Then we discuss the solution
method for the infinite horizon version of the model when agents
have CARA utility.
Results in the two-period model: First we show that here is
a unique equilibrium without social insurance. Comparing the
budget constraints for agents who work in sector 1 and agents
who search, it is clear that when p =3where =
agentswho stay in sector 1 and agents who search have the same
expected present value of income. Since agents are risk averse,
V1() ￿ V1z(15).Sinceconsumption in the first period is a nor-
mal good, c(p) is increasing in p, and since c}(13) =1,from the
feasibility constraint (1), it is clear that there cannot be an equi-
librium with p> /3.Sinceagents who work in sector 1 are lenders
when p ￿ /3,V11(p)is decreasing in p and since those who search
are borrowers, Vf(p) is increasing in p, so there is at most one p
at which these functions intersect. If j5 </9and these functions
intersect at some p E (fi,i3),then the equilibrium has search, that
is, z >0.If either j5 ￿ /3 or j5 </3 andthese functions do not
intersect at some p E (,/3), thenthe equilibrium p =/3 andthere
is no search, that is, z =0.
Now we show that there is a unique equilibrium with social in-
surance. Note that when there is complete insurance, agents who
search and agents who remain in sector 1 have the same wealth
only if p =j5.Thus, if i </3, thenis the equilibrium bond
price and there is search in equilibrium. If j3 ￿ /3,then/9 is the
equilibrium bond price and there is no search in equilibrium.
Results in the infinite horizon model: In this subsection we
present a method for solving the closed economy infinite horizon
model when agents have CARA utility. In this economy we as—
sume that agents get paid their marginal product and that the
only asset that agents trade is a one-period risk free bond. An
allocation in this economy is a set of sequences
{.X+1, c(b), z'(b), c(b)}0,
31and value functions {V'(b), V(b)}, whereis the number
of agents well-matched in sector A, c(b) is the consumption of
agents who are well-matched in sector A and have bond holdings
b at date t,c(b) is the consumption of agents who are not well-
matched in sector A and have bond holdings b at date t,zt'(b)E
{O,1} is the decision of agents who are not well-matched and have
bond holdings b to search (z= 1)or work in sector 1 (z =0)at
date t, and V' (b) and V (b) are the discounted expected utilities
from date tonof agents in sectors 1 and A respectively. Let
be the distribution of initial bond holdings for those who are
well-matched in sector A,be the distribution of initial bond
holdings for those who are not well-matched in sector A, and
be the number of agents initially well-matched in sector A. Let
{pt}o be a sequence of bond prices, where p is the price paid
at date ttoreceive a bond which pays off one unit for sure at
date t+1. The resource constraints in this economy are
f(b) +fc(b)p =(1- +A,
where iO andare the distribution of bond holdings for both
types of agents as determined by those agents decision rules and
the evolution of the number of agents well-matched in sector A
is given by )4= rfb zt(b)d,b' +
In equilibrium without social insurance, we require that agents'
decision rules solve the following utility maximization problems
stated as Bellman equations when bond prices {pt} are taken
as given: c(b) solves
VA(b) =maxu(cj)+/3V1(b+1)
subject to the budget constraint
Ptbt+i + Ct= b+ A,
and c'(b), zt'(b) solves
=maxu(ct) + (1 —
c,b+1,zt
32Zt/3[1rV1(b+i) + (1 —r)V1(b+i)]
subject to the budget constraint
p2b+1+c =b+(i —zj)
andthe constraint that Zt E{O,1}.
We solve for the equilibrium without social insurance as follows.
Given one-period bond prices define time zero prices
as qo =1,and qj =>ip fort ￿ 1. Agents who are











ii ={H+1+ (log(p) —log(/3))]pt/(pt+ Qt+i).
The utility of agents who are in sector I at date t and choose to
search for a match in sector A is given by





and lim F =F88where F88 is the fixed point of this expression
when p =3.The consumption of these agents is given by
c(b)=Qtbt+Hj+Ft.
The utility of agents who are in sector 1 at date t and choose to
work in that sector is given by
V'(b) =— exp(—-yQtb)exp(—yHt) x
exp(—ypL/(pt + Qj+i)Ft+i) exp(yQ+i/(p + Q+i)).
Their consumption is given by
c'(b) =Pt/(Pt+ Qt+i)F+i + Q(bt + 1) + H.
Note that agent's incentives to search are not affected by their
level of bond holdings. We solve for the transition working back-
wards from a terminal date T and a value of A close to one.
We set FT+1 =F38,HT+1 =0,and QT+1 =(1—/3).Observe that,
working backwards in time,
=(- — irz)/(1 — zjlr)
where Ztisthe fraction of agents not in sector A who search at
date t. Given the solution for prices from date t + 1 on, we first
guess zj =1and find the corresponding bond price Pt which clears
the goods market at date t. If, at this bond price, the value of
searching exceeds the value of working in sector 1, then this is the
equilibrium bond price at date t and everyone in sector 1 searches
at this time. If the value of searching does not exceed the value of
working in sector 1 at this bond price, we then solve for the bond
price Pt that makes individuals indifferent between searching and
34working in sector 1. In this case, this is the equilibrium bond
price at date t,andthen ztischosen to clear the goods market
at date t.Weiterate on this procedure until ) falls below zero.
The solution of the model when there is social insurance is sim-
plified by the assumption that agents have identical homothetic
preferences. In this case, the equilibrium with social insurance
maximizes the discounted expected utility of the representative
agent subject to the resource constraints given above. The solu-
tion to this problem is found as the solution to the Euler equation
u'(c) =/[irA + (1
—ir)Iu'(ct+i).
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